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Police ethics and integrity: Can a new code overturn the blue code?   
Louise Westmarland (corresponding author 
louise.westmarland@open.ac.uk )and Mike Rowe 
Abstract 
This paper analyses police officer perspectives on the seriousness of potential 
misconduct or unethical behaviour, and the factors that might shape whether they 
would report their colleagues' misdemeanours. It compares responses from police 
officers in UK three forces, looking at potentially corrupt behaviours described in a 
series of scenarios. The discussion includes why some types of misdemeanour seem 
more likely to be reported and the potential effects of a newly introduced formal Code 
of Ethics. In terms of differences between ranks and roles, and different responses 
from different services, the study suggests that the way police culture operates is 
significant and needs to be more widely addressed. The study used scenario based 
questionnaires to elicit views about the seriousness of certain police behaviours and 
to ask whether officers would report colleagues' misdemeanours. It develops a 
previous survey by one of the authors which conducted a similar survey published in 
2005. Using the same questionnaire the new study examined a larger and more 
diverse sample of serving officers (n=520). This new study compares responses from 
police officers in UK three forces, geographically distributed across the country and 
have differing characteristics in terms of size, rurality, population density and 
policing priorities. 
Key words: ethics and integrity, police culture; blue code of silence; code of ethics;
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Introduction  
Internal solidarity and unwillingness to ‘snitch’ are said to cover up a range of 
behaviours from brutality to bribery and perjury to protectionism in the police. The 
existence of a ‘blue code’, ‘wall’, or ‘curtain’ of silence is debatable but as Skolnick 
(2002, p. 7) asserts, there are unwritten rules which ‘sustain an oppositional criminal 
subculture protecting the interests of police who violate the criminal law’. An 
international study upon which this present research is based concluded that ‘the most 
dramatic finding that emerges from the contours of integrity concerns the worldwide 
prevalence of the code of silence’ (Klockars et al. 2004, p.17).  In an attempt to 
provide some further empirical evidence of the so-called blue code of silence this 
paper aims to address a number of key research questions around the way police 
officers regard certain misbehaviours and whether they would report deviant 
colleagues. We draw upon a survey of serving UK police officers in 2011 to address 
three key questions. First, to assess officers’ knowledge of their organisation’s rules; 
second to explore what officers regard as ‘serious’ misdemeanours; and, third, their 
propensity to report them. We consider the significance of the harmful outcomes of 
various actions versus their ‘crime’ or legal value in terms of seriousness of offence 
or punishment. Throughout the paper we explore these themes and link them to issues 
of internal solidarity, loyalty and accountability. Towards the end of the paper we 
discuss these issues in the light of a code of ethics which has been introduced recently 
by the UK’s College of Policing. Our key findings are that acquisitive misdemeanours 
(behaviour that is 'bent for self', to use Punch's (2009) term) was regarded as more 
serious than other types of concern. Further, we re-affirm that officers were often 
reluctant to report misdemeanours, even when these were regarded as serious. 
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Although more serious offences were more likely to lead to reporting, large 
proportions of officers still would not report the more problematic behaviour. Officers 
in the more rural force were more likely to report than the other two, as were those in 
supervisory roles, and those with less length of service. Thirdly, we found no clear 
association between the (potential) harm associated with each behaviour and 
respondents’ evaluation of seriousness. Potential negative impacts relating, for 
example, to perversion of the course of justice, did not necessarily relate to 
judgements about the gravity of the conduct. 
 
In exploration of these themes we took pertinent characteristics of police culture, or 
cultures, into account. Cultural beliefs such as partner loyalty provide a framework 
upon which the survey is based although we acknowledge that this is a contested area 
without universally agreed definitions. Similarly, we acknowledge that the ‘blue 
code’, which prevents police misbehaviour being revealed and increases the 
likelihood of malpractice, is contested. Despite the definitional difficulties, the debate 
about ‘culture causing corruption’ deserves further examination.  The discussion that 
follows considers the extent of the influence of police cultural traits, such as loyalty 
and discretion on officer’s propensity to break the supposed blue code by reporting 
colleagues who bend or break the rules. In addition to these questions about the 
impact of cultural values, we were also interested in other variables that might 
influence officer perceptions. To consider whether the concept of the cynical ‘uniform 
carrier’ (Reiner 2010, p. 120) is still pertinent the survey posed questions about length 
of service and rank. By asking the sex of respondents we were able to consider 
whether male or female officers might make different ethical choices around to 
reporting a colleague’s misdeeds. Furthermore, the inclusion of three police services 
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allowed consideration of whether geographic location and size of police force affected 
the results. We also explored the ways in which locality and the rural/urban setting 
might make a difference in attitudes and responses.  
 
 
Background 
As observational field work studies from the 1960s onwards have shown, one of the 
characteristics of police occupational culture is a strong bond of affinity between 
colleagues. In some of these early accounts of accompanying police officers on duty, 
writers such as Banton (1964), Skolnick (1966) and Bittner (1967) observed that the 
officers always backed each other up and were constantly on the alert for potential 
danger. As Reiner (2015, p. 319) says, for Skolnick, ‘mainstream police culture is 
characterised by isolation, solidarity, suspiciousness and conservatism, all 
constructing a picture of a “symbolic assailant”, threatening order and the police 
themselves’.  One of the enduring characteristics of police culture is claimed to be an 
unwillingness to report colleagues who violate the rules. In Skolnick’s (2002, p.8 
original emphasis) more recent work on the blue code he argues that ‘loyalty to fellow 
officers is a key feature of the culture of policing, regardless of whether criminality is 
involved’. Skolnick (1991) provides evidence of public inquiries and investigations 
which have uncovered police corruption, including examples of telling lies and 
extreme brutality where officers had seemed confident that the code of silence would 
protect them. He cites the shocking and brutal attack of Rodney King in Los Angeles 
in 1991 which was broadcast worldwide. Officers who could have stopped the attack 
stood by and those carrying it out seemed unworried by the presence of police 
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observers. Skolnick (1991, p. 7) argued that ‘those who participated must have 
believed they could count on their colleagues to lie in case of an investigation’.   
This solidarity and confidence in being backed up by colleagues, according to Kleinig 
(1996), is because police officers are governed by an unwritten set of cultural rules. 
These rules demand competing loyalties, but loyalty to (police) partner is above all 
others and the whistle blower is viewed with contempt (Kleinig 1996, p. 74). One of 
the main issues around the adherence to the blue code is the way group solidarity may 
prevent unethical behaviour coming to light due to its fostering of a ‘no-snitch’ 
culture. Aside from the stigma attached to being known as a ‘rat’ or snitch, there is 
the additional worry that colleagues may not come to the aid of a whistle-blower if he 
or she is in danger. The documented experiences of Frank Serpico illustrate this 
(Maas 1973). As a maverick detective in a US police department in the 1970s Serpico 
was seriously injured and colleagues did not make concerted attempts to save him. 
Maas argues that this was because he had refused to take part in the corrupt activities 
of his colleagues and had given evidence to a tribunal against some of them. Cultural 
beliefs around loyalty are also related to police discretion and accountability. The 
discretion which is built into police practice demands that decisions around what is 
‘right’ or ‘moral’ to be constantly under review as officers decide what action to take 
in any given situation. As Kleinig (2013, pp. 30-31) argues, a police officer is not 
confronted simply with someone who has broken the law, but ‘a human being with 
such-and-such characteristics who appears to have broken the law in such-and-such 
circumstances’. As officers often encounter prolific law breakers they might be 
encouraged to view their own behaviour favourably in contrast to the people they 
meet in the course of their duties. The cop culture ‘blue’ code of ethics, amongst other 
beliefs, holds that police officers ‘fight with one hand tied behind our back as 
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criminals don’t have a code of ethics’ (Author 1, 2016, p.13) and in comparison to the 
activities of those they arrest, their own misdemeanours may seem trivial.   
In addressing the role of culture in relation to police integrity we are mindful that 
culture does not exist in isolation from the organisational context of policing and the 
roles that officers perform. Following Loftus (2010) we argue in the conclusion to the 
paper that enduring characteristics (both negative and positive) of police culture need 
to be understood in terms of institutional, social and political pressures that shape 
policing. An advantage of including three different forces within the study is that is 
allows the opportunity to consider different organisational dynamics that might 
interact with the blue code and to consider this wider context in which officers react 
to potentially unethical behaviour. 
In summary, the paper explores a range of misdeeds on duty including some ‘serious’ 
offences, and whether officers would report their colleagues. We also explore whether 
this is dependent upon certain variables such as the number of years’ service, gender, 
the perceived harmfulness of the offence and the geographic location of the force. We 
analyse officers’ ranking of which scenarios they counted as more or less ‘serious’, 
and to what extent this would affect whether they would report a colleague’s 
misbehaviour. In the discussion which follows we relate our findings to some 
previous studies of a similar type (Klockars et al. 2004, Westmarland 2004, 2005, 
Rowe 2007) and discussions around loyalty, discretion and accountability.  We end 
the paper by reflecting on a new formal code of ethics introduced by the UK College 
of Policing in 2014.       
Methods 
As discussed in more detail below, the survey used a series of scenarios to ask about 
some ethically challenging situations to discover how serious the infringements were 
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regarded. The dilemmas posed by the situations included whether respondents would 
report hypothetical misdemeanours. Kleinig (2013 p. 27 original emphasis) claims 
that ‘scenarios offer opportunities for practical moral reflection based on situations or 
sets of circumstances that might be encountered in the real world’. The vignettes were 
adapted from an original survey aimed to assess the degree of seriousness officers 
attribute to various actions and their willingness to report the misconduct of other 
officers (Klockars et al. 2004, p. 10-12).  The questions were originally designed to 
elicit opinions about police integrity in relation to a spectrum of activities, some of 
which seemed mundane and could be justified in some circumstances, while others, 
such as theft and deception, were clearly breaking organisational rules. Violations of 
criminal law, including theft and accepting bribes were included at the other end of 
the range of behaviours. The responses to these questions as to how serious the 
respondents rated the activities were then compared with the data indicating whether 
officers said they would report colleagues’ misbehaviour.  
 
As some of the survey’s scenarios describe ‘minor’ deception or mundane matters we 
might expect respondents to say they would not report these actions. Two of the other 
scenarios involved the theft of goods or cash of a significant value and it is reasonable 
to assume that they would be more likely to be reported. A third type of scenario 
presented some potentially difficult situations that might require discretionary 
responses to moral dilemmas. These involved wrongdoing in a legal sense but which 
might be against ‘blue code’ rules to report. What is acceptable in any organisation is, 
to some extent, informed by cultural norms. Police officers often have to make 
decisions which involve weighing up their powers of discretion against the numerous 
written and unwritten rules and regulations. Waddington (2013, p.12) argues that the 
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police are similar to medical practitioners, in that ‘their practice too involves ethical 
dilemmas aplenty’. In essence the scenarios in the survey were aimed at interrogating 
the level of malpractice that would have to be apparent before the majority of officers 
would ‘definitely report’ the misbehaviour.  
 
As mentioned earlier, one of the academic studies which led to the development of 
this paper began with an international project to compare police ethics and integrity 
across various countries (Klockars et al. 2004).  In that survey, one of the authors of 
this paper conducted a small scale study of a police force in the south of England 
which fed into the comparative analysis by Klockars et al (Westmarland in Klockars 
et al. 2004) that was later published as a paper concentrating on the UK part of the 
study (Westmarland 2005).  The earlier study (n= 275) uncovered some interesting 
issues about the existence of a ‘blue curtain’ of silence, where some officers said they 
were unlikely to report offences, even when they thought ‘serious’ rule breaking had 
taken place. The wider international study found that ‘the most dramatic finding that 
emerges from the contours of integrity concerns the worldwide prevalence of the code 
of silence’ (Klockars et al.2004, p.17).  
 
In 2011, funding was obtained to conduct a wider study of UK forces, using the same 
questionnaire, with the aim of surveying a larger sample of officers and a wider 
geographical distribution. The present paper reflects upon this larger survey of police 
officers in three forces across the UK with a total response of 520 police officers. It 
concentrates on the aspects of the survey which asked about officers’ opinions of the 
seriousness of various misdemeanours which were presented in 11 scenarios. 
Respondents were then asked how likely it was that they would report these actions 
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and behaviours. Officers were asked to indicate on a scale (from one to five) how 
serious they regard particular actions and whether they would tell anyone about it.  
 
The Questionnaire Scenarios 
 
1. A police officer runs a private business in which he sells and installs security devices, such as 
  alarms, special locks, etc. This work is done during off-duty hours. 
2. A police officer routinely accepts free meals, cigarettes and other items of small value from 
  shopkeepers on his beat. He does not solicit these gifts and is careful not to abuse the 
  generosity of those who give gifts. 
3. A police officer stops a motorist for speeding. The officer agrees to accept a personal gift for 
  half of the amount of the fine in exchange for not issuing a summons. 
4. A police officer is widely liked in the community, and on occasions such as Christmas local 
  shopkeepers and restaurant and bar owners show their appreciation for her attention by 
  giving gifts of food and alcohol. 
5. A police officer discovers a burglary of a jewellery shop. The display cases are smashed and it 
  is obvious that many items have been taken. While searching the shop, he takes a watch, 
  worth about two days pay for that officer. He reports that the watch had been stolen during 
  the burglary. 
6. A police officer has a private arrangement with a local vehicle body shop to refer the owners 
   of the cars damaged in the accidents to the shop. In exchange for each referral, he receives a 
   payment of 5% of the repair bill from the shop owner. 
7. A police officer, who happens to be a very good car mechanic, is scheduled to work during 
  some planned forthcoming holidays. A supervisor offers to authorize these days off, if he 
  agrees to tune-up the supervisor’s personal car. Evaluate the SUPERVISOR’S behaviour. 
8. At 2am, a police officer, who is on duty, is driving a patrol car on a deserted road. She sees a 
  vehicle that has been driven off the road and is stuck in a ditch. She approaches the vehicle 
  and observes that the driver is not hurt but is obviously intoxicated. She also finds that the 
  driver is an off-duty police officer. Instead of reporting this accident and offence, she 
  transports the driver to his home. 
9. A police officer finds a bar on his beat which is still serving drinks an hour past its legal 
  closing time. Instead of reporting this violation, the police officer agrees to accept a couple of 
  free drinks from the owner. 
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10. Two police officers on foot patrol surprise someone who is attempting to break into a car. He 
  runs off. They chase the suspect for about two streets before apprehending him by tackling 
  him and wrestling him to the ground. After he is under control, both officers punch him a 
  couple of times in the stomach as punishment for fleeing and resisting. 
11. A police officer finds a wallet in a car park. It contains the amount of money equivalent to a 
  full-day’s pay for that officer. She reports the wallet as lost property, but keeps the money. 
 
The 11 scenarios were described in some detail in the questionnaire and demanded a 
reasonable level of concentration. As with the earlier study in 2004, the questions in 
the 2011 study were primarily aimed at throwing light on the belief that police culture 
demands that colleagues do not blow the whistle on colleagues. The survey was not 
trying to establish whether officers engaged in misdemeanours, but whether they 
would tell anyone and if there was any association between ‘seriousness’ and 
reporting. Loosely structured focus group discussions were held in each police area 
with senior officers to review the survey findings and capture their insight into 
resultant issues. These were further enhanced by discussion among experts at a 
Parliamentary Select Committee seminar at which the results were presented in early 
2012. 
 
Following extensive consultations three forces took part in the study.  These were the 
only volunteers after a series of approaches and appeals to senior officers to give 
permission for their force to participate. Fortunately the three volunteer forces were 
different in a number of ways. Force 1 was a large organisation with major cities and 
mixed rural areas within its remit.  Force 2 was a large metropolitan force with 
significant areas of largely isolated rural areas and Force 3 was small rural force. 
They were from different regions of the country: one located in the middle of 
England, one in the west and one in the north.  
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The survey 
 
The survey took the form of a paper booklet consisting of the 11 scenarios that 
officers had to rate. Questionnaires were sent to each police force in boxes by person 
or post and distributed at shift briefings. Each survey had an addressed, pre-paid 
envelope in which to place the completed questionnaire. This was then returned 
directly to the named lead researcher at the university marked ‘confidential’. Due to 
this process anonymity was guaranteed to individual officers although it was possible 
for the researchers to discern from which force they originated due to a colour coding 
system. In the following discussion forces are identified as 1, 2 and 3 and following 
the completion of the study Chief Constables in those forces were given the results of 
their part of the survey, but not told the identity of the others. 
 
The total return rate varied from force to force although this is slightly misleading at 
individual force level (see Table 1 below). This is because the researchers could not 
be certain of the exact number of delivered questionnaires which were handed to 
officers for completion.  At the end of the data collection period of around six months 
520 questionnaires were received from the three forces in total. The substantial 
number of responses enabled a computer statistical system (SPSS) to be used to 
analyse the findings and compare responses with variables such as years’ service, 
gender and type of geographic location.  
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Table 1 Distribution and return rate of questionnaires (n=520) 
 Responded Distributed Return Rate 
Force One 102 750 13.6% 
Force Two 110 1,500 7.3% 
Force Three 308 750 41.1% 
 
 
 
As with all paper surveys, one of the problems for this analysis is that the response 
rate relies on all of the questionnaires delivered to the force being placed in the hands 
of officers who could then choose whether or not to respond. In the case of Force 2 
for example, a large metropolitan force, the rate was very low, and although large 
numbers of questionnaires were delivered we could not determine how many were 
actually distributed or discarded by officers.   Around half of the boxes of 
questionnaires were returned untouched.  
 
Composition of sample 
 
Having received the questionnaire and considered the scenarios, officers were asked 
to answer some demographic questions including an indication of how long they had 
served as a police officer and how many years they had been in their current role or 
location. The sample had a broad range of officers with varying years’ service, 
adequate for the analysis, and showed that a significant proportion of officers had 
been in their current location for a fairly short period of time. The following tables 
illustrate the composition of the 520 officers who responded to the questionnaire.  
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Table 2 Number of years served as a police officer by force area 
 <1 1-2 3-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 >20 
Force One 1% 5.9% 21.6% 30.4% 9.8% 6.9% 23.5% 
Force Two 0% 10.9% 17.3% 29.1% 12.7% 9.2% 17.3% 
Force Three 0% .6% 7.1% 24.4% 15.9% 14.3% 37% 
 
 
Table 3 Years served in current location or role 
 
 <1 1-2 3-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 >20 
Force One 11.8% 19.6% 37.3% 20.6% 4.9% 1% 4.9% 
Force Two 5.5% 21.8% 21.8% 25.5% 10% 4.5% 5.5% 
Force Three 11.4% 14.3% 28.6% 28.2% 9.1% 1.6% 6.2% 
 
Officers were also asked to indicate their gender on the questionnaire. The sample 
composition was broadly representative of women officers nationally which was 
around 26.2 per cent at the time of the survey (Home Office 2011).  This compares 
with our sample consisting of women officers comprising between 29% and 34%. 
 
Table 4 Gender of officers by force area 
 Male Female 
Force One 60.8% 29.4% 
Force Two 52.7% 34.5% 
Force Three 65.6% 27.3% 
 
The questionnaire requested information about an individual’s role partly because one 
of the scenarios involved the assessment of a supervisor’s behaviour regarding the 
granting of a day’s leave. In terms of whether certain actions would be reported, it 
might be expected that supervisors might be more likely to report rule breaking as 
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part of their role, but perhaps less likely to observe such behaviour, being somewhat 
removed from front line duties.     
 
Table 5 Number of officers in supervisory and non-supervisory roles 
 
 Non-supervisor Supervisor 
Force One 69.6% 29.4% 
Force Two 70.9% 23.6% 
Force Three 61.7% 35.7% 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
As might be expected, the scenarios where officers’ behaviour was for personal gain 
were the ones viewed as most serious by almost all officers who responded. Stealing 
money, taking an expensive watch and accepting a bribe from a speeding motorist 
were all at the top of the scale of seriousness and were ranked as most likely to be 
reported. Next, there was a ‘middle’ range of misdemeanours they viewed as ‘serious’ 
which included use of excessive force and covering up for a drink driving colleague. 
These were less likely to be reported. Finally there was a category comprising of the 
least serious behaviours such as accepting gifts or a supervisor offering a day off to an 
officer in return for carrying out work on a privately owned vehicle. These were 
unlikely to be reported in most cases. 
 
In terms of the behaviours classed as the least serious, there seemed to be an element 
of uncertainty about the rules and regulations. In some cases officers were not clear 
about the bending of rules covering ‘minor’ offences such as working in their spare 
time or accepting free drinks or small gifts. In response to the question about an 
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officer running a security firm in his own time, some officers wrote on the comments 
such as ‘this is not against force regulations’ or ‘it depends if he had permission’. This 
was also clear at feedback meetings with senior officers which the research team 
arranged. Some senior officers whom we consulted at these meetings confessed to 
being uncertain as to the regulations regarding second jobs. Rules varied between the 
three forces we surveyed, ranging from not being allowed to have paid work outside 
the force to being able to do so at the Chief Constable’s discretion. 
 
Officers who responded thought that running a business on the side and accepting 
small gifts were the least serious behaviours, They thought that misdemeanours such 
as hitting a suspect or covering up for a drink driving colleague who caused an 
accident were less serious behaviours than stealing property, such as a watch, or cash 
from a lost wallet or accepting a bribe from a speeding motorist. The following table 
provides a summary of the scenarios with the activities they thought the most 
‘serious’, although in the survey they were more detailed. Table 6 shows the ranking 
the respondents assigned to each scenario, with 10 being the least serious.   (10 is 
least serious, 1 is most serious). 
 
Table 6 Scenarios ranked in terms of seriousness by respondents 
Scenario Ran
k 
A police officer runs an off-duty private business that sells and installs 
security devices.    
10 
A supervisor authorises a day off in exchange for body work on his personal 
car.  Officers were asked to rate the supervisor’s behaviour. 
8 
A well-liked officer receives gifts such as food and alcohol on occasions 
such as Christmas. 
11 
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An officer accepts a couple of free drinks from the owner of a bar that is 
serving drinks after the legal hour rather than report the offence. 
6 
An officer accepts unsolicited items of small value (cigarettes, free meals) 
whilst on duty being careful not to abuse the generosity of the gift giver. 
9 
An officer agrees to accept a personal gift for half of the amount of the fine 
in exchange for not issuing a summons to a speeding motorist. 
3 
An officer finds a lost wallet that contains the equivalent of a full day’s pay.  
The officer turns in the wallet, but takes the money. 
2 
An officer refers owners of vehicles damaged in an accident to a local body 
shop and receives 5% of the repair bill for each referral. 
5 
An officer takes a watch worth about two days’ pay from a burgled jewellery 
shop prior to other officers arriving on the scene. 
1 
At 2 AM, an officer comes across a car in a ditch.  The officer realizes the 
driver is intoxicated and an off-duty police officer.  He brings the off-duty 
officer home instead of reporting the accident. 
 4 
Officers chase a suspect for two streets before wrestling him to the ground.  
Once under control, the officers punch the suspect a couple times as a 
punishment for fleeing and resisting. 
 7 
(10 is least serious, 1 is most serious n= 520) 
 
One of the key themes of the study was to examine the likelihood of reporting 
colleagues’ behaviour, and whether this would be related to how serious the offence 
was regarded.  As might be expected, the highest levels of reporting were associated 
with the behaviours officers thought most serious. One of these was taking money 
from a found wallet. As Table 6 shows, almost all respondents thought it serious or 
very serious, and in force 3 (the small rural force) 95% said they would report it. A 
slightly lower percentage of Force 2 (metropolitan centre and large cities and 
conurbations within a large geographic area) respondents said they would definitely 
report this behaviour.     
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Table 8. Whether officer taking money from a lost wallet was ‘serious’ and would 
report 
 
Officer takes money from a lost wallet (Q 11) 
  Considered the 
behaviour 
serious  
Definitely would 
report  
Force 1  99%  84%  
Force 2  100%  80%  
Force 3   99%  95%  
 
 
As might be expected, the less serious the offence, at least in terms of the 
respondents’ opinions, the fewer the positive responses as to whether they would 
‘definitely’ be reported. In scenario 10, where a suspect is assaulted - there were some 
interesting differences between officers’ responses which depended on their years in 
service as an officer and their location. In Force 2, officers with less than 5 years’ 
service were the most unlikely of all the respondent groups to say they would report 
this behaviour. In terms of the accepted wisdom on police cultural beliefs, this might 
seem unusual, as ‘cynics’ or ‘police pessimists’ (Reiner 2010, p. 120-121) would 
normally be expected to be older, longer serving officers who had ‘seen it all’. This 
finding might indicate that those at an earlier stage in their career felt more tightly 
bound to the blue code and less likely to ‘snitch’ on their colleagues 
 
Table 9 Years as officer compared with whether they would report excessive force 
 
Officer uses excessive force on fleeing suspect (Q 10) 
  Years as officer % Would 
report 
Force 1:   5 or Less 59% 
6-15 65% 
>15 81% 
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Force 2:   5 or Less 48% 
6-15 62% 
>15 79% 
Force 3:   5 or Less 88% 
6-15 86% 
>15 82% 
 
Overall our findings suggest the reinforcement of some previously accepted beliefs 
about police and whistle blowing, and some surprising differences. In terms of what 
we might expect as scholars of policing, stealing and acquisitive corruption, or ‘bent 
for self’ is regarded as very serious behaviour that most respondents said they would 
definitely report. Other actions, such as the covering up for a drink driving colleague 
and those who assaulted suspects, were viewed as less serious than stealing and 
officers were not so certain that they would report them. Minor discrepancies were 
unlikely to be reported. 
 
Analysis 
In order to examine these findings we considered a number of issues that could affect 
the results.  We looked at variables such as being situated in a rural or an urban area; 
the officer’s gender; their role; whether working in a supervisory position; and the 
number of years’ service the officer had completed.  These issues are considered in 
turn in the following sections of the paper.  
 
Rural versus urban 
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Taking a more detailed explanation of the findings, one of the key characteristics 
which might explain the differences in preparedness to report could be the difference 
between rural and urban police forces. It might be expected that officers based in rural 
versus those in urban or mixed areas might take different a view on what is ‘serious’ 
or the giving and receiving of gifts, due to local community traditions. Research 
suggests (Yarwood, 2015, Young, 1993) that cultural identity and relations among 
police and with wider community networks have features in rural police that are 
distinct from urban environments. The forces in this study included one (force 3) that 
was characterized as a small, rural police force; while Forces 1 and 2 identified 
themselves as large, metropolitan forces.  Of the scenarios that were considered 
‘serious’ by almost all officers, those in Force 3 said they would ‘definitely report’ 
more than those in Forces 1 and 2. 
 
Table 10 Seriousness and likelihood to report officer taking money from lost wallet 
by force area. 
 
Officer takes money from a lost wallet (Q 11) 
 Considered the behaviour 
serious 
Definitely would report 
Force 1 99% 84% 
Force 2 100% 80% 
Force 3 99% 95% 
 
 
Of the behaviours that were considered not so serious by most officers in the sample, 
respondents in Force 3 were generally more willing to report most of the activities 
outlined in the scenarios.  The only exception was Question 4 – an officer receives 
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small gifts at Christmas.  In this case the officers in Force 3 were similar to the other 
forces in their reluctance to definitely report this behaviour.  
 
Table 11 Whether officers would report a colleague accepting small gifts at Christmas 
 
Officer accepts small gifts at Christmas Q4  
 Definitely would report 
Force 1 8% 
Force 2 17% 
Force 3 15% 
 
When we discussed these findings with the senior management team of the small rural 
force, they said they expected these responses was because ‘everyone knows 
everyone here’ and ‘if someone does something wrong it stays with them for the rest 
of their career’. They also said that because officers live in the area they police it 
would also be known about by the local populace, and so this would be an even 
bigger threat to their reputation and a disincentive to bend or break the rules. One of 
the senior officers pointed out that recruits may have a relative formerly or currently 
working for the organisation, meaning that this would be an even greater deterrent to 
misbehaviour. These findings reflect research suggesting that the personal impact of 
the work environment can be stronger on officers in rural rather than urban 
environments (Buttle et al. 2010). 
 
Gender 
 
There were no differences in responses by gender on the seriousness of the 
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behaviours.  Both men and women were in agreement regarding the seriousness of the 
scenarios.  There was also no difference between men and women on whether they 
would report the offence.   
 
Role: Supervisor v. Non-Supervisor 
 
We found that in most cases there was a significant difference between supervisors 
and non-supervisors regarding whether they would report the behaviour; except for 
question number 5 (where an officer takes an expensive watch from a jewellery shop 
burglary) and number 7 (supervisor behaviour).  In general, supervisors would report 
all the behaviours mentioned in the scenarios more often than the sample as a whole, 
especially the instances that most respondents considered minor, or non-serious.  In 
terms of most organisations this makes sense – a person in a supervisory role would 
feel more obligated to report violations of the rules. Feedback from senior officers 
also supported this supposition. They said that supervisors would feel it was their duty 
to report misdemeanours and they would feel confident about the procedures 
involved. As discussed below, this is one example of how the organisational context 
in which the officer works inter-relates with working culture. 
 
Table 12 Whether officers would report by supervisor/ non supervisor role 
Number of years’ service 
 
Officer runs a side business (Q 1) 
Force 1 % Would Not Report % Would Report 
Non- Supervisor 62% 17% 
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Supervisor 23% 57% 
Q2.  Officer accepts gifts of small value 
Force 1 % Would Not Report % Would Report 
Non-Supervisor 66% 23% 
Supervisor 37% 57% 
Q1.  Officer runs a side business 
Force 2 % Would Not Report % Would Report 
Non-Supervisor 50% 31% 
Supervisor 39% 39% 
Q2.  Officer accepts gifts of small value 
Force 2 % Would Not Report % Would Report 
Non-Supervisor 45% 33% 
Supervisor 27% 39% 
Q1.  Officer runs a side business 
Force 3 % Would Not Report % Would Report 
Non- Supervisor 47% 31% 
Supervisor 18% 60% 
Q2.  Officer accepts gifts of small value 
Force 3 % Would Not Report % Would Report 
Non-Supervisor 39% 40% 
Supervisor 22% 59% 
 
The survey responses revealed that in terms of the most serious behaviour it did not 
matter how many years an officer had been a serving officer; they all answered each 
of these questions in a similar way. In effect, whether experienced or new to the job, 
officers agreed on what was ‘serious’. In general terms they all agreed on the level of 
seriousness. However, as with the distinction between supervisor and non-supervisor, 
whether the officer would report the behaviour did depend on years in the force. 
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Officers who had been in service for 5 years or less would report the behaviours less 
often, while officers who had been on the force for 15 years or more would report the 
behaviour more often.  This analysis was based on all of the three forces combined.  
When separated from the other data however, Force 3 did not reveal the same pattern, 
further indicating that organisational context shapes and filters working culture.   
 
Table 13 Whether officers would report excessive force by years as an officer 
Officer uses excessive force on fleeing suspect Q10 
 Years as 
officer 
% Would report 
Force 1: 5 or less 59% 
6 – 15 65% 
>15 81% 
Force 2: 5 or less 48% 
6 – 15 62% 
>15 79% 
Force 3: 5 or less 88% 
6 – 15 86% 
>15 82% 
 
 
When we discussed these findings with Force 3’s senior management team they were 
largely underwhelmed. In fact, the results we had found most surprising – that newer 
‘ideologically fresh’ recruits would be less likely to report than the ‘hardboiled’ 
cynics (Reiner 2010, p.120) was regarded as completely normal by the officers at the 
meeting. They argued that officers with more years’ service would be confident about 
the rules and to whom they should report whereas newer recruits would be worried 
about challenging senior officers or those with more service.   
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Discussion 
In terms of the findings and the existence of a ‘blue code’ relating to whether officers 
would report colleagues’ misdemeanours, and issues around subcultural solidarity, 
rule breaking and (non) reporting, three main issues arose from the analysis.  
 
1 Officers are not certain about the ‘rules’ 
 
This paper concentrates primarily on how serious officers believe some behaviours to 
be and whether they would report a colleague. One of the first things to determine 
was whether respondents thought the particular action was contrary to their force 
regulations. Almost all of the scenarios were contravening a rule, although in some 
cases in very minor way, such as scenario 2 ‘accepting small gifts’.  In terms of one of 
the ‘minor’ infringements – where an officer was conducting a private business on the 
side, there was some confusion and difficulty with the question.  In the free text 
section at the back of the questionnaire officers wrote comments such as ‘this isn’t 
against the rules’ or ‘it depends if permission was sought’. We recognise of course 
that many of the individual police forces across the UK have different regulations and 
this was partly the reason for asking this question.  
 
Focus group discussion with senior officers in each force allowed elaboration. We 
told them about the confusion regarding minor infringements, and provided feedback 
on our findings. When we asked senior officers about their policies on staff running a 
private security business, which was the scenario in the survey, there was confusion.  
Some of the senior teams were unsure, some said it was allowed, some that it was not 
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permitted, others that it was discretionary. One senior officer checked with a member 
of his team, during our meeting with them, to make sure he knew the correct answer. 
At a national level it seemed that there was no universal strategy and at a force level a 
degree of uncertainty. From the survey responses, and the senior officers’ feedback 
meetings, it seems that there was some confusion around the minor infringements at 
many levels in the organisations. It seems likely that this provides for circumstances 
in which officers do not have reference to a clear set of standards, and that this is an 
organisational short-coming that inter-relates with occupational culture. 
 
This was not the case in the more serious cases however, and there was almost 
universal response to most of the misdemeanours such as keeping the money from the 
lost wallet and the watch from the jewellery shop burglary and the bribe from a 
motorist. These are clearly legal infringements and so it is probable that officers had 
no sense of ambiguity as to the organisational expectation, unlike in the previous 
example. There were two more ‘ambiguous’ cases – where officers were not 
completely certain about whether to report, and these were the drink driving and the 
use of excessive force scenarios. These were clearly against force rules and in most 
cases classed as ‘serious’ by respondents, but not always likely to be reported.  
 
The following table shows the way all officers who responded ranked the seriousness 
of the actions described in the scenarios, including an average of their responses. 
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Table 14 Average seriousness and the rank of the scenario –(1 being least serious, to 
11 being most serious). 
 
Case Average Seriousness Rank 
1 – Off duty security 
business 
3.023 2 
2 – Gifts from 
shopkeepers 
3.463 3 
3 – Speeding motorist 4.944 9 
4 – Christmas gifts 2.829 1 
5 – Watch theft 4.994 11 
6 – Kickback from garage 4.627 7 
7 – Supervisor  4.070 4 
8 – Cover up drink driver 4.741 8 
9 – Free drinks at bar 
open late 
4.551 6 
10 – Excessive force 4.474 5 
11 – Wallet  4.981 10 
 
 
2 Officers not willing to report colleagues’ misdemeanours  
 
What is most significant for our argument that the ‘blue code’ of silence is still 
important was the finding that even where officers were certain that behaviours were 
against the rules and they thought that the infringements were serious, they were not 
always willing to report colleagues’ actions. For example, in one force, less than 50% 
said they would definitely report a colleague who covered up for a drink driving off-
duty police officer who had crashed his car. Others indicated that they thought 
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punching a suspect in the stomach was ‘serious’ but would not necessarily report it. It 
is this evidence that we use to support our assertion that that the ‘blue code of silence’ 
(Westmarland 2005) is preserved, possibly because officers have no confidence in 
their management (Huberts et al. 2003) or possibly because they are worried that they 
will be blamed, stigmatized, subjected to ‘overt hostility’ (Miller 2003, p. 32) or 
ignored. 
This represents another important organisational dimension to the issues examined in 
this paper, which is that police service responses continue to be shaped by a command 
and control disciplinary approach. While there might often be good reason to take 
disciplinary action against officers who do not behave with integrity, a wider 
organisational ‘blame culture’ that responds to problems primarily at the level of the 
individual staff members might deter officers from reporting minor infractions. This 
might mean that misdemeanours continue unchecked and might escalate in gravity. 
Moreover, if less serious misdemeanours remain hidden, police services will not be 
able to use such behaviour as an organisational learning opportunity. Organisational 
efforts to develop and apply early warning indicators to identify and respond to minor 
misdemeanours might present an opportunity for improvement. Casting these in such 
terms – rather than as disciplinary matters – might help to reframe police culture such 
that reporting becomes seen as less problematic. In his analysis of institutional 
responses to error in policing, Shane (2013, p. 2) noted a similarly problematic 
tendency for police services to approach such issues as individual rather than 
organisational terms: 
When searching for the causes of the harm, it is not sufficient to 
examine the active failure in isolation from the organisational 
context in which it occurred, which means also examining the 
cascade of underlying conditions that coexisted and perhaps 
facilitated the unsafe acts. While the individual operator is not 
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absolved from responsibility for their acts or omissions, they are 
operating inside a bureaucracy that has ensnared them with a set of 
cultural and operating practices that might deviate from accepted 
standards. 
 
The differences between the small rural force and the larger mixed and metropolitan 
ones, and in the reporting levels of those with different length of service suggest 
organisational context needs consideration.  It also suggests that the role status of 
officers has an influence, reminding us that culture is not an all-powerful explanatory 
concept.  
 
3 Police Officers’ beliefs about which scenarios are most ‘serious’ might not take 
harm and risk into account 
 
From the responses there was fairly widespread agreement as to what sort of 
behaviour is regarded as ‘serious’. The two scenarios concerning outright theft -
stealing a watch from the scene of a jewellery shop burglary and cash from a found 
wallet - were seen as the worst offences by almost everyone. Nearly all the 
respondents said that they would definitely report these actions. Other behaviour, such 
as the use of excessive force and covering up for a drink driving colleague were rated 
as less ‘serious’ than taking the money or the watch by most respondents. In some 
cases less than 50% of officers who responded said they would report these 
behaviours. Despite this, the potential outcome from these actions of covering up for a 
drunk driver or assaulting someone with a pre-existing medical condition could be 
much more harmful to the individual or to society at large than an officer stealing 
property or cash. Whilst few would agree that a police force with officers who 
thought that stealing by ‘finding’ or taking a watch is acceptable, it might be regarded 
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as less serious than the harm and risk involved in physical violence or drink driving. 
In feedback meetings we were told that police officers are used to judging actions by 
the rule of law and an offence’s ‘crime’ value. In other words, a theft would usually 
carry a higher penalty in the criminal justice system than an assault, and would be 
easier to prove. One suggestion we were offered was that officers would rank these 
sorts of behaviours by their colleagues in a similar way, using a tariff of seriousness 
to which they were accustomed. Police organisations might use this finding to 
develop a response to reporting misconduct such that officers are encouraged to 
consider the risks they might face in terms of not reporting. This does not have to be 
framed in a disciplinary manner but might be based on not implicitly tolerating, and 
so encouraging, behaviour at odds with professional codes of practice. 
 
Evidence of the ‘Blue Code’?  
The main findings of this research are in line with previous published studies using a 
similar questionnaire (see Klockars et al. 2004, Westmarland 2005). Although the 
sample size for the present study was larger than previous studies in the UK, the same 
attitudes towards the similar offences was observed. Stealing money, goods and 
accepting bribes were all seen as ‘serious’ and likely to be reported. ‘Minor’ 
infringements were less likely to be seen as serious, and correspondingly less likely to 
be reported. In terms of two of the ‘middling’ serious offences – covering up for a 
drink driving colleague and the excessive force towards a suspect were less clear cut. 
As tables 9 and 13 illustrate, fewer than half the officers who responded would have 
‘definitely’ reported these actions.  In terms of the aims stated in our opening 
discussion therefore, we have shown that the ‘blue code’ still plays a part, but not 
regarding ‘acquisitive’ or ‘bent for self’ corruption. The activities that officers could 
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clearly label ‘crime’ – stealing the cash and the watch or the bribe from the motorist-  
were examples of this, but the lesser offences – perjury in the case of covering up for 
the drink driver, and not reporting an assault in the case of the suspect, were less 
clearly viewed as requiring action.  
 
Could a formal code of ethics help?  
As mentioned in the introduction to this paper, the UK’s College of Policing 
published a formal Code of Ethics in 2014. Although previous police regulations 
stipulated that officers should not ignore colleague’s rule breaking, the new code 
strengthens and makes more explicit the requirement for officers to report their 
colleagues’ misdemeanours.  The new code states that it ‘requires everyone in 
policing to prevent unprofessional conduct by questioning behaviour which falls 
below expected standards. Additionally, it supports reporting or taking action against 
such behaviour’ (College of Policing 2014).  The Code has been introduced by the 
College as part of their drive to ‘professionalise’ the police and to provide a formal set 
of ethical guidelines and standards of behaviour commensurate with this status. 
   
There is now an explicit requirement for officers to ‘blow the whistle’ on colleagues 
who commit misdemeanours as the Code says ‘all staff have a duty to act if they 
believe the Code may be breached’. As the title of our paper suggests we wonder how 
the ‘new code’ will interact with the ‘blue code’? To borrow a phrase1 from 
organisational management studies, ‘will culture eat strategy for breakfast?’  As some 
of the behaviours described in this paper are shown as unlikely to be reported. This is 
the case even where respondents considered them ‘serious or very serious’, such as 
                                                 
1 Usually attributed to Peter Drucker, we are unable to find the original source 
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the excessive use of force and drink driving, and so it is difficult to predict the 
potential effectiveness of the newly introduced formal Code. The misdemeanours 
described in the survey cover a wide range of potentially unacceptable behaviours, 
from receiving gifts to stealing relatively large amounts of money or valuable goods. 
The ones concerning obtaining goods or money – sometimes called ‘acquisitive’ 
corruption, in that the officer gains some benefit, however small, are easier to codify; 
but the ones classed as ‘noble cause’ corruption, which is where there is no 
discernible benefit to the individual officer are more difficult to define. ‘Noble cause’ 
corruption or the ‘Dirty Harry’ syndrome, is described by Punch (2009, p. 23) as 
‘cops using ‘dirty’ means for ‘good” ends’ and is sometimes encouraged by cultural 
codes. By this definition acting with ‘honesty and integrity’, as required by the new 
formal code of ethics, might in some circumstances include using dirty means.   
 
There is a long history in police culture literature in many jurisdictions describing 
what Punch calls the difference between ‘bent for self’ and ‘bent for job’ (Punch 
2013, p. 3). He makes the distinction between rule bending being ‘for’ or ‘against’ the 
interests of the organisation (Punch 2009, p. 34), in the sense that some actions are 
viewed as being wrong, but carried out for the right reasons. Kleinig (2013 p.31) 
argues that a ‘police officer who pulls over a speeding does not necessarily make a 
bad decision in issuing a warning rather than a ticket if the driver appears contrite or 
was trying to respond to an emergency’ as the ‘wise use of discretion’ requires 
practiced engagement. An example of how officers might use their discretion is 
shown in the spaces on the questionnaire that invited responses to be written about the 
survey itself.  Officers who wrote remarks about the drink driving scenario, where an 
over the limit colleague was transported home without being reported made 
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comments such as ‘would need more information’, ‘is it the first offence?’ ‘He might 
be going through a divorce’. At feedback sessions officers explained that to lose a 
valued colleague, over a one-off mistake would not be good overall for the 
organisation, or for society in general, and so the rational action would be to help the 
colleague, rather than report the misdemeanour. As Punch (2009, p. 3) suggests, this 
is an example of the ‘complex, many-faceted’ and ambiguous nature of a subversive 
‘under-culture’ that exist in police organisations and it is one which the new formal 
Police College Code may have to tackle. Moreover, our findings demonstrate 
considerable uncertainty about regulations governing behaviour, which suggests that 
any statement, whatever its content, needs to be strongly articulated and embedded 
into the routines of operational policing. In terms of clarity of rules and regulations, 
differences between ranks and roles, and variations between the three services, the 
study suggests that the organisational context in which police culture operates is 
significant and needs to be more widely addressed. 
 
Concluding issues 
This paper reports on the first UK-wide survey of serving police officers to consider 
questions of integrity and attitudes towards corruption and misdemeanours on duty.     
The survey was administered throughout 2011 and the findings were reported to a 
Parliamentary Select Committee conference in January 2013.  The survey was 
distributed during a period of change in UK policing as the College of Policing was 
being developed bringing along a new, formal Code of Ethics. It remains to be seen 
whether the new Code will change behaviour or beliefs and it would be interesting to 
repeat the survey once the Code is embedded. This said, we are not implying that the 
police officers who responded to our survey are ‘unethical’ or lacking in integrity. We 
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recognise the shortcomings of scenario style questions in terms of the difference 
between ‘what people say and what they otherwise do’ (Deutscher, 1973, p. 2) and the 
pressures to conform to internal codes of practice and organisational targets. Neither 
are we arguing that ‘cop culture’ is responsible for corrupt behaviour, or a totally 
negative influence. As Waddington (1999, 2013, p. 3) pointed out the blue code, has 
many positive aspects, and most police officers are dedicated, love policing and want 
to do a good job. On the other hand, we do question how the new College of 
Policing’s Code of Ethics will overcome the much stronger and long established ‘cop 
code’ especially as the new code seems to take no account of existing police culture 
or notions of within-group or partner loyalty. In essence we are questioning how a 
‘new’ code can overturn the powerful influences of long standing police cultural 
beliefs and how a formal code introduced from above will overturn the ‘blue code’ of 
the streets. Additionally responses need to be improved within police organizations 
outwith established disciplinary and regulatory frameworks for dealing with 
individual miscreants. 
 
In conclusion, we also recognise the shortcomings of our findings in that our research 
is not broad or deep enough to answer some arising questions. We also recognise that 
there are limitations associated with the questionnaire that this paper describes. Some 
of the scenarios are seen as ‘unlikely’ and behaviours considered outlandish, although 
discussions with police professional standards officers during access arrangements for 
the survey suggest that each one evokes a recent a real life example with which they 
were familiar. As stated at the beginning of this paper, the study aimed to throw light 
on attitudes towards reporting behaviour, rather than the actions themselves. As such, 
the findings, albeit limited to three forces, show that the ‘blue wall of silence’ still 
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exists, and that work needs to be done to reassure officers who feel unable to report 
colleagues’ unethical or illegal behaviours. Some positive aspects of the research 
include the way that police officers have a strong and unfailing ‘moral compass’ when 
it comes to some actions and beliefs, especially where theft is concerned; that many 
officers would report colleagues’ misdemeanours, and that they are willing to take 
part in a survey to examine these issues. Perennial tensions around the way the police 
must work effectively within an ethical framework, whilst remaining effective and 
efficient remain unresolved however and further research into how and why officers 
keep the ‘blue code’ would be timely.  
 
Table 15 about here 
 
1. A police officer runs a private business in which he sells and installs security 
devices, such as alarms, special locks, etc. This work is done during off-duty hours. 
2. A police officer routinely accepts free meals, cigarettes and other items of small 
value from shopkeepers on his beat. He does not solicit these gifts and is careful not 
to abuse the generosity of those who give gifts. 
3. A police officer stops a motorist for speeding. The officer agrees to accept a 
personal gift for half of the amount of the fine in exchange for not issuing a summons. 
4. A police officer is widely liked in the community, and on occasions such as 
Christmas local shopkeepers and restaurant and bar owners show their appreciation 
for her attention by giving gifts of food and alcohol. 
5. A police officer discovers a burglary of a jewellery shop. The display cases are 
smashed and it is obvious that many items have been taken. While searching the shop, 
he takes a watch, worth about two days’ pay for that officer. He reports that the watch 
had been stolen during the burglary. 
6. A police officer has a private arrangement with a local vehicle body shop to refer 
the owners of the cars damaged in the accidents to the shop. In exchange for each 
referral, he receives a payment of 5% of the repair bill from the shop owner. 
7. A police officer, who happens to be a very good car mechanic, is scheduled to work 
during some planned forthcoming holidays. A supervisor offers to authorize these 
days off, if he agrees to tune-up the supervisor’s personal car. Evaluate the 
SUPERVISOR’S behaviour. 
8. At 2am, a police officer, who is on duty, is driving a patrol car on a deserted road. 
She sees a vehicle that has been driven off the road and is stuck in a ditch. She 
approaches the vehicle and observes that the driver is not hurt but is obviously 
intoxicated. She also finds that the driver is an off-duty police officer. Instead of 
reporting this accident and offence, she transports the driver to his home. 
35 
 
9. A police officer finds a bar on his beat which is still serving drinks an hour past its 
legal closing time. Instead of reporting this violation, the police officer agrees to 
accept a couple of free drinks from the owner. 
10. Two police officers on foot patrol surprise someone who is attempting to break 
into a car. He runs off. They chase the suspect for about two streets before 
apprehending him by tackling him and wrestling him to the ground. After he is under 
control, both officers punch him a couple of times in the stomach as punishment for 
fleeing and resisting. 
11. A police officer finds a wallet in a car park. It contains the amount of money 
equivalent to a full-day’s pay for that officer. She reports the wallet as lost property, 
but keeps the money. 
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